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Introduction 
Agriculture in Kenya remains a dominant sector in the economy accounting for 25% of GDP and 
60% of export earnings. The sector also indirectly contributes another 27% to the GDP through 
linkages with manufacturing, distribution and service related sectors and accounts for 60% of 
total national employment. Out of the total labour force, women contribute 75% of the labour 
force (Republic of Kenya, 2004a). The majority of Kenya’s population (80%) lives in rural areas 
and derives its livelihood from agriculture. Approximately 51% of the population is also food 
insecure (ibid.). Agriculture growth is thus critical for economic development and alleviation of 
poverty. A comprehensive understanding of the historical and current national agricultural 
development issues is a critical initial step in identifying the combination of policies that may 
contribute towards turning around smallholder agriculture. 
The centrality of the agricultural sector to national development is exemplified by policy 
documents that have been produced since the 1960s. The purpose of these policy documents has 
been to engender meaningful development through the eradication of poverty, ignorance and 
disease. Indeed, the core policy document, Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965 on ‘African Socialism 
and Its Application to Planning in Kenya’, broadly spelt out the developmental contours that the 
post-independence nationalist regime would take. The document envisaged a form of unbalanced 
development biased towards the high potential agro-ecological areas in Kenya in Central and 
parts of the Rift Valley provinces. These two provinces are inhabited by the core ethnic political 
constituencies of the post-independence government. These communities constituted the most 
politically and economically mobilised communities who, through the ideological debates 
between the political parties KANU and KADU, were able to impose pressure on the incumbent 
government to fulfill the nationalist promises of land and freedom.1 
In specific terms, ethnic communities supporting both political parties were predominantly made 
up of smallholder farmers; those with landholdings between 5 to 7 acres, which were resettled in 
the former “white highlands” in the Rift Valley and Central province. The government’s 
resettlement policy had brought in a wave of largely Kikuyu peasants into what were previously 
white owned farms. This policy was undergirded by the ethnically selective provision of 
                                                 
1 In particular, Kikuyu and Luo formed the core political constituency of KANU, which fronted for a centralized 
system of government. The minority Coastal communities, Luhya and Kalenjin, supported the KADU, which argued 
for a quasi-federalist system of government. 
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government support services. However, Kenya’s ‘golden age’ (from the time of independence in 
1963 up until the late 1970s)– the basis of its international reputation for so-called successful 
development - of capitalist economic growth was short-lived. By the late 1970s/early 1980s, a 
host of internal and external factors converged to reverse the modest gains in welfare that had 
been achieved (see Lofchie, 1989).  
The smallholder sector continues to face a myriad of challenges related not only to colonial and 
post-colonial state policies, but also misguided development theories and models (see Cohen, 
1988). Agriculture in Kenya has undergone major changes over the past decades since the 
implementation of structural adjustment beginning in 1988 and other sectoral reforms. The 
effects of these policies and programs on agricultural productivity continue to be debated. 
Donor-supported evaluations present evidence of a broad economic turnaround in Africa based 
on increased agricultural productivity growth. Macro-economic and agricultural sectoral reforms 
are identified as major factors explaining the rise in productivity growth (see USAID, 1993; 
Block, 1994; Sahn and Sarris, 1991; World Bank, 1994). However, in contrast, analyses 
supported by UNICEF and FAO have strongly questioned the effects of structural adjustment 
and/or food sector reform on agricultural productivity growth and household food security (see 
Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart 1987; Mosley 1994).  
This study examines the historical and current performance of the smallholder sector in Kenya. It 
analyses some of the strategies smallholders and their allies have forged to respond to the 
diminishing government budgetary allocations to the sector since the 1980s. It addresses several 
questions. What policy and other factors currently work against the sustainable development of 
smallholder agriculture in Kenya? How have the smallholders responded to these challenges? 
Section one examines the national profile of smallholder agriculture in Kenya. Section two 
describes the methodology used for data collection and analysis. This is followed by a discussion 
of key issues in smallholder agriculture and the nature of government interventions in the sector. 
Section four analyses the nature of agricultural policy making in Kenya. Section five deals with 
the state of contemporary policy advocacy, it does so by looking at the responses of farmer 
organisations to the changing fortunes of agricultural development in Kenya. The final section 
constitutes recommendations and concluding remarks. 
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Smallholder Agriculture in Kenya 
The post-independence agricultural policies about the smallholder sector in Kenya trace their 
roots to the colonial period (see Alila, 1977). Colonial policies favored mainly the White owned, 
large scale commercial farm sector. Kenyan agriculture had a dual structure under which British 
colonial agricultural policy emphasised separate development of European settlement areas. The 
core purpose of the dual policy of agricultural development was the creation of an agrarian 
capitalist economy, geared towards repaying loans earlier provided by the British Treasury to 
build the Mombasa-Kampala railway, a key valve for British imperial resource extraction (see 
Leys, 1975). A key pillar of this strategy entailed the massive dislocation of indigenous 
communities and their ‘containerization’ in native reserves, which provided a constant source of 
cheap labour for colonial capital. In total, 11 million acres was carved up for the development of 
a white settler enclave which straddles the present day Central and Rift Valley provinces (see 
Sorrenson, 1968).  
Over time, increasing population pressure in the reserves led to technological stagnation, 
underdevelopment and low food production. These contradictions crystallized into the Mau Mau 
radical rebellion for land and freedom which accelerated the process of decolonization. A core 
political constituency of this rebellion was a closely forged alliance between squatters residing in 
the Rift Valley, who bore the disproportionate brunt of colonial dislocation and social 
deprivation and the emergent petite bourgeoisie, both in Nairobi and in the farms in the Rift 
Valley, who gave coherence to the movement (Furedi, 1989; Kanogo, 1987). 
Colonial response to the agrarian rebellion was the Swynnerton Plan, which instituted reforms in 
land tenure (titling) and rural economy in Central Province. In a bid to stem the Mau Mau 
rebellion, the colonial state instituted a rapid land titling programme whose purpose was to 
isolate the radicals while cultivating a conservative smallholder class. This set the basis of post-
independence agrarian conflicts. Land titling was aimed at rewarding loyalists while isolating the 
radicals, through the creation of a politically conservative Kikuyu agrarian class that could act as 
the counterpoise against any future militant nationalists among the Kikuyu (Leys, 1975; 
Hearbeson, 1973). The net impact of this programme was thus to incorporate the emerging 
smallholder class into the global export commodity markets, through the simultaneous 
introduction of cash crops (coffee, tea) and improved farming techniques, in the context of an 
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accelerated land titling programme. Land was therefore critical, not only to processes of class 
formation, but also informed the critical issues around which the Lancaster House independence 
talks revolved (see Wasserman, 1976; Harbeson, 1973). 
To be sure, ethnic communities in Kenya were integrated differentially into the colonial agrarian 
capitalist economy. The subsequent emergence of cooperatives, new farming techniques and 
cash crops in the post-colonial period, largely placed the Kikuyu at the forefront in the struggle 
for control over post-independence national resource distribution. The colonial agrarian economy 
deliberately generated ethnic-based inequalities, thus polarizing relations between Central 
province (where the Kikuyu predominantly reside) and the rest of Kenya (Ngunyi, 1996). These 
ethnic-based inequalities created the basis on which future ethnicisisation of political processes 
would advance. Coming to terms with the partial success of post-independence smallholder 
agriculture in Kenya therefore requires an examination of the role of smallholders as a critical 
political constituency of the nationalist government. 
There are very rich debates on the peasantry in Kenya. These debates revolved around the nature 
of the peasantry and its dynamics (see Kenya: the Agrarian Question, Review of African Political 
Economy 1981, No. 20). Colin Leys (1975) et al. pioneered studies on the relation between land 
and class formation and consolidation. MukaruNg’ang’a (1981) asserted that the colonial state’s 
land titling programme isolated radicals and created a conservative smallholder class which led 
to post-independence agrarian conflicts. After he examined what was happening at that time to 
the peasantry, he concluded that, the expansion of the peasantry seemed to take place in tandem 
with the interests of foreign capital. Thus, while local capitalist interests may have sought to 
destroy peasant production, foreign finance capital seemed to struggle to preserve the peasant 
commodity production. Yet, the general assumption of the peasantry as a class in itself betrayed 
the multi-occupational nature of the emerging rural social structure. Moreover, the weak 
generalization of this study stems from its focus on Central province alone. The responses of 
peasantries in other parts of the country are not known. 
This is also true of Nyong’o’s (1981) analysis. According to him, while foreign finance capital 
was actively encouraging capitalist development in Central, the tendency in Nyanza was toward 
the stagnation and/or destruction of the middle peasantry. Indeed, rather than capital 
accumulation, an alliance of merchant capital and peasants fought against the land titling 
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programme in Nyanza. The net consequence was the propagation of increased migration of wage 
labor to other parts of the country, especially urban centers, due to the limited capitalist 
development in Nyanza. This partially explains the differential political and economic 
performance of the peasantry in terms of its limited resource mobilisation capacity to pressure 
the state to implement pro-peasant agricultural policies.  
On the contrary, while the logic of polarization is apparent in capitalist development everywhere, 
Leys (1971) saw the expansion of the peasantry in the Kenyan context as an obstacle to capital 
accumulation. Instead of consolidating capitalism, a frozen peasantry merely served to solidify 
the emergent patron-client relations characteristic of the Kenyan political economy. Despite 
expanded peasantisation processes, Kenya’s uni-modal model of development registered an 
annual agricultural growth rate of 4.9 and 3.8 % between 1964-1974 and 1975-1978 
respectively.2 By 1977 smallholders were producing approximately 30% of Kenya’s coffee and 
tea.  
By the late 1980s, there was what is commonly referred to as the end of the coffee boom, 
external oil shocks, declining internal production and rising indebtedness; the state increasingly 
faced fiscal problems. This led to the imposition of paternalistic structural adjustment 
programmes emphasising budget rationalisation and administrative decentralisations. The need 
to fill the vacuum left by the inability of the state to provide social services witnessed the rise of 
a vibrant peasant-based self-help movement – Harambee – which was geared toward provision 
of rural social services. The small and middle peasants who constituted the bulk of the self-help 
movement in Kenya seemed to force the Kenyan state to be minimally accountable to the public 
in the realm of social services (See Barkan and Holmquist 1989, p.361).  
                                                 
2 The unimodal model of development is known in policy debates as a model under which smallholdings 
are comparatively more productive than large farms. The concomitant assumption holds that a small %age 
increase in productivity from many millions of small farmers would significantly enhance food security 
more than large farms, which would require a larger increase in output to bridge the same gap. Channeling 
scarce resources to the small farm sector is likely to prove more beneficial for overall production. In 
addition, the model pointed out that large farms were becoming less productive, reducing the smallholders’ 
proportion of land and resulting in increased rural-urban migration, unemployment and lower productivity 
of large farms. Thus, the main thrust of this model is equitable distribution of resources to the poorest 
elements in the population mainly the smallholders through central government control of land and 
regulated distribution of agricultural inputs, infrastructure development, and farm credit provision (see 
Cohen, 1988). 
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Yet Widner (1994) seems to dispute this hypothesis. Her findings indicate that with regard to 
their capacity to support broad national policies favorable to agriculture, most “semi-competitive 
systems are alike (p.128)”. A semi-competitive political system generates such policies for 
reasons that have little to do with the character of the regime (ibid). In this instance, higher 
producer prices and pressure against overvaluation of the currency derived from the personal 
interests of senior officials of the Agriculture ministry and elites in both the Kenyatta and Moi 
regimes. During this period, producers and smallholders boasted receipts of over 90% of the 
world market price for coffee and tea. However, this is only indirectly related to the nature of 
electoral rules which delineate the space for public contestation of policies. 
Indeed, with the change from Kenyatta to Moi, changes in electoral rules had far reaching effects 
on the “voice” of smallholder farmers. This transition coincided with the disintegration of the 
nationalist coalition and the consolidation of presidential authoritarianism (Nyongo’o 1989). 
Characterised by de-institutionalisation of the agricultural parastatal sector and the “looting” of 
erstwhile Kikuyu capital, Moi sought to build his Kalenjin political base in close alliance with 
Asian capital and a galaxy of ethno-regional patrons in order to consolidate control of the state. 
Hence, the concomitant development of Nyayo tea zones was biased toward the tea sector 
farmed largely by Kalenjin smallholders, leading to the gradual neglect of the coffee sector (a 
Kikuyu mainstay). The net consequence over time was the de-mobilisation of smallholder 
organisations and their re-orientation toward “service delivery” at the behest of the state. 
Furthermore, increasing global competitiveness through liberalisation and deregulation of the 
agricultural sector left the smallholder sector unprepared to respond to the surge in imports and 
lessened state protectionism. 
Methodology 
This study combined secondary and primary data collection methods. Secondary socio-economic 
data was obtained from Government Agricultural Annual reports, statistical abstracts, Welfare 
Monitoring Surveys, and Economic Surveys. Archival research and compilation of statistical 
data were used to support the qualitative data whenever possible. Information from these 
publications was used to map the national profile of the smallholder agricultural sector and to 
provide the background on which the dynamics of farmer advocacy can be understood. 
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This was followed by fieldwork which utilised a semi-structured questionnaire. Interviews with 
individuals and focus groups were done using the questionnaire. Fieldwork was conducted across 
a sample of sites with substantial smallholder agriculture and advocacy movements. Interviews 
were held with key informants including leaders of advocacy organisations and senior civil 
servants. Questions focused on marginalisation of smallholder farmers and/or their differential 
treatment by the state vis-a-vis the lavish state support of large scale- farming, especially in Rift 
Valley and Central.3 This disproportionate treatment of farmers primarily highlights problems of 
land tenure and related policies. These are clearly mentioned in the AU CAADP document, 
specifically the Pillars of Smallholder Production, and easily fit within the problematique of 
agricultural policy in Kenya. The adoption of AU/CAADP framework points to the need to look 
at land and water management, labour and inputs and technology and market access.    
Key Issues in Smallholder Agriculture 
Consistent growth in agricultural productivity in Kenya is constrained by a number of factors. 
Key among these factors is inequality in landholdings and inefficient land use patterns; 
inefficient marketing systems characterised by poor roads, limited storage capacity and poor 
access to markets; low and inappropriate use of improved inputs such as fertilisers and certified 
seeds due to high costs; and low investment in agricultural research and development. In 
addition, low levels of value addition to agricultural products make key agricultural exports less 
competitive on the global market.  
Nevertheless, a desire for a commercially oriented and internationally competitive agricultural 
sector continues to inform current government agricultural development objectives of poverty 
reduction and meeting the first MDG goal of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger (The 
African Executive, 21-28, May 2008). Current initiatives undertaken by the Agriculture ministry 
are geared toward addressing the challenges and constraints affecting smallholder farmers 
through increased commercialisation. Prominent among these policies is the review and 
harmonisation of the legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks, in order to create an 
enabling environment for production and marketing. In addition, privatisation of non-core 
                                                 
3 This is in line with the Sessional Paper No.10 (1965) which favoured the investment of state resources in the so-
called high potential areas. Broadly, these areas fell in Rift Valley and Central province. Fieldwork was carried out 
in selected areas within these provinces. 
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functions of the parastatals and ministries is being undertaken to bring about efficiency, 
accountability and effectiveness in administrative operations and to increase access to quality 
farm inputs and financial services (ibid.). In this context, key issues in the smallholder sector can 
be understood along the four NEPAD/CAADP priority pillars for comprehensive agricultural 
development in Africa: land and water management, rural infrastructure and market access, food 
supply and hunger reduction and agricultural research and development.  
Land and Water Management 
Kenya’s agricultural production patterns are based on a dual land ownership structure, 
characterised by a well-resourced large farm sector specialising in export crops (coffee, tea, 
wheat, etc.) and poorly resourced “communal” areas with high land pressure, poor infrastructure 
and persistent food insecurity. Indeed, the large farm sector dominates the less than 20% of land 
in Kenya categorised as high-medium potential arable land with average annual rainfall of 1,200 
mm. The long rains in these areas extend from March to June while the short rains occur from 
October to December. These skewed land distribution patterns are further segmented along class, 
ethnic, gender and generational terms.  
In Kenya, farmers are conventionally categorised into large, medium and small farmers. Large 
farmers are those with holdings of 20 hectares or more; medium farmers’ holdings range from 
eight to twenty (8-20 ha) while small farmers are categorized as those with holdings of eight 
hectares or less. In the mid-1970s, the three categories accounted for 20,000, 270,000 and 
10,340,000 farmers respectively (see World Bank 1984). Recent estimates show that 59.5% of 
the population operates small farms between 0.01-3.0 hectares, 11.4% operate over 3 hectares 
and 22.7% hold tiny plots of land (see Welfare Monitoring Survey II 1994). Indeed, landlessness 
is estimated to hover above 30 % of the total population. While small farmers are found all over 
the country, large farms are largely a phenomenon of the Rift Valley especially in UasinGishu 
and Trans Nzoia districts.  Large farms in these districts mainly grow maize and wheat although 
there are significant medium farms that grow the same crops. With minimal variations, current 
statistics indicate that small farms continue to account for over 70% of total crop production 
while the rest is shared between medium and large farms (see Welfare Monitoring Survey, II 
1994; Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey, 2005).  
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The bulk of production and consumption of total crops is accounted for by holdings of less than 
3 hectares. Most of the crops produced are consumed within the areas of production. Apart from 
cash crops, fruits also account for a very low proportion of sales and consumption. Explicit 
government policy support in the 1970s and 1980s encouraged small-scale producers to adopt 
and expand the production of selected export cash and food crops. The government thus 
expanded crop buying and processing capacity to service new areas in production. It also 
provided credit and extension support to producers, and maintained a relatively extensive 
network of collection depots for encouraging smallholder marketing of cereals. Acreages under 
these crops have slowed down considerably since the early 1990s. Indeed, no crop has registered 
a higher rate of growth in the 1990s than in the 1980s except French beans and, marginally, 
pyrethrum (see Nyoro and Jayne 1999, p.).4. 
Limited expansion has generally occurred since 1990 in the low potential arid and semi-arid 
areas because of population pressure in the high potential areas and the resulting shortage of 
additional fertile land. This implies that future production growth in Kenya will rely on 
increasing production strategies comprising intensive use of productivity enhancing inputs 
and/or shifting to higher-valued crops. 
Currently, Kenya's total irrigated area is about 80 000 hectares (ha). Public and private small-
scale irrigation is still less than 50 000 ha. The bulk of water management practices by 
smallholders revolve around the use of rainwater harvesting, bucket irrigation, gravity fed 
sprinklers, pedal pumps, motorized pumps, and small earthen dams. These practices depend on 
the availability of adequate water volumes of rivers and consistent rainfall patterns. However, 
droughts, erratic rainfall patterns, competition for water resources by both industry and 
agriculture, and human-wildlife conflicts hamper adequate access to water.  
The need for pro-active policies for soil and water conservation is underscored by the recent 
eviction of peasants from the Mau Forest – Kenya’s largest water catchment area - which is 
crossed by major rivers. The water from Mau forests serves more than 4 million people 
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inhabiting more than 578 locations in Kenya and several locations in Northern Tanzania. In 
addition, the Mau Complex provides continuous river flow and favourable micro-climate 
conditions which are essential to crop production as well as biological diversity. The government 
adopted the new National Land Policy (2009) and entrenched the land as a constitutional 
category in the new constitution (August, 2010). Both moves seek to provide a framework for 
comprehensive land reforms as part of the overall constitutional review process. In the course of 
implementation of the National Environment Action Plan (NEAP) and Environment 
Management and Coordination Act (1999), the government established the National 
Environmental Management Authority (NEMA), responsible for setting and enforcing 
environmental standards. These standards were fully operational by 2005, in tandem with a 
natural resource inventory and valuation process. 
Rural Infrastructure and Market Access 
The importance of rural infrastructure in lowering production costs and easing market access is 
crucial for promoting agricultural productivity. Improved access to markets is facilitated by the 
construction of rural access roads and harmonization of taxes, improving the delivery of 
government research extension and formulating food security policies and programs. These 
policies are predicated on the government’s commitment to gradually increase budgetary support 
to the agricultural sector to at least 10 % of the National budget, in line with the Maputo 
Declaration.  
Inadequate rural infrastructure has made agricultural and industrial goods in Kenya 
uncompetitive in the region and internationally. For instance, only 4.6% of rural households have 
access to electricity compared to about half in urban areas (SID Report, 2004, p.28). Indeed, 
energy costs constitute over 40% of total manufacturing costs. Hence, agricultural produce in 
Kenya is marketed in different ways. Farmers sell directly to consumers in local markets through 
cooperatives, middlemen, and export sub-contracting. However, export sub-contracting is still 
not well-established due to the high costs involved with meeting technical (sanitary and 
phytosanitary) and financial standards for entry. Furthermore, market information is lacking so 
that farmers who transport their produce to distant urban and rural markets often lose out when 
prices are not favorable. Mismanaged marketing cooperative societies and unions rarely pay 
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farmers promptly. As a result, farmers are exploited by middlemen who pay farmers low prices 
when traditional buyers are no longer available. 
The government’s focus is on reducing transport costs by improving rural roads and reducing 
fuel taxes, bringing down the cost of electricity to reduce irrigation and factory operating costs, 
and strengthening communications to improve access to market information. Reforms are being 
undertaken to improve competition in inputs distribution and marketing and to resolve 
governance issues in the inputs market. These include enforcing the law against fraudulent 
practices by suppliers and marketing agents. Revitalisation of cotton and rice production will be 
supported by means of rehabilitation and development of irrigation systems and introduction of 
new high yielding seed varieties (see Daily Nation, August 23 2009). 
The Kenyan smallholder farmers have been left out of extension and marketing services and 
access to cheap credit for a long time. However, new initiatives by government are reversing 
these trends.  Recently, the GoK’s refurbished Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) entered 
into an agricultural financing agreement with a private sector bank where the former provides 
guarantee for loans. Farmers’ groups can now access credit for buying inputs. For example, the 
recent Kilimo-Biashara (“agri-business”) initiative between the Government and the private 
sector, where farmers access credit at affordable rates from a commercial bank credit facility of 
Ksh.3.2 billion. The purpose of this initiative is to enhance food security.5 Tentative data indicate 
that the initiative has issued credit to approximately 180,000 farmers surpassing the initial target 
of 35,000 farmers. Those borrowing less than Ksh.50, 000 are categorized as smallholders. This 
initiative has contributed towards an increased production and has in the short term mitigated the 
effects of drought.6 
Furthermore, the GoK’s Ministry of Agriculture has recently introduced 1,500 rural based 
information desks providing extension and advisory services to farmers. The service is 
complemented by radio programmes in local languages which are instrumental in disseminating 
topical issues affecting smallholders in their production and marketing process. Government 
                                                 
5 The credit facility of Ksh.3.2 billion was solely offered by Equity Bank but was guaranteed by the 
government. Loans were offered in kind consisting of inputs – fertiliser (top dressing) and seeds. 
Beneficiaries – small and large farmers obtain a quotation from any local stockist of these inputs and then 
forward the same to the bank for approval.  
6 Interview with senior Agriculture ministry official. 
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extension services also focus on marketing and value addition to enable farmers to access wider 
markets and realise higher returns.  
However, issues of graft still negatively affect the proper implementation of government policy. 
The National Cereal and Produce Board – the national body charged with managing the 
country’s strategic grain reserve – is charged with stabilising the producer prices and 
encouraging further production. In order to stabilise fertiliser prices, in May 2009 the 
government authorised the relevant state corporations to procure 35,000 metric tonnes of 
fertilisers. The institution has been rocked by corruption scandals over irregular sale of maize 
stocks at a time of ravaging droughts. Its perennial incapacity to offer better prices to farmers 
remains a problem. 
Agricultural Research and Development 
The knowledge and capacity for technology development and application in Kenya is still 
inadequate.  Limited skills and poor local leadership have been cited as the most important 
barriers to effective information flow to farmers, whereas government and NGO based extension 
service providers stress lack of resources to mobilise communities and poor communications 
with researchers leading to information distortion (see Rees et. al. 2000). Furthermore, due to the 
inadequate capacity of the leading state research institutions, farmers continue to complain about 
lack of information on technical details of farming. Such information includes details on 
chemical application rates, how to manage late blight in potatoes, where to get certified seed, the 
most appropriate varieties for a given location, housing and management of livestock (ibid). 
Government policies and financing have generally tended to favour the development of a private 
sector that depends on expensive equipment imported from abroad. While there is a growing 
development of production of low-cost equipment by small-scale entrepreneurs/artisans such as 
low-pressure butterfly sprinklers and pedal pumps, this industry is handicapped by lack of access 
to credit and poor distribution systems. Overall, there remains little national awareness of 
innovative, lower-cost technologies and their possibilities. The pump importers are also severely 
handicapped by strict borrowing conditions, high import duties and costs of input materials, and 
restrictive import licensing (FAO, 1997). Marketing, distribution and servicing of equipment is 
very poor. Pump breakdowns are a major problem; farmers are not trained to maintain pumps 
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and do not generally have spare parts. Overall, while the government has put a lot of effort into 
crop and livestock research, much less effort has gone into support for agricultural engineering. 
Moreover, the costs of technological equipment, especially motorized pumps, are still high. Such 
equipment presupposes a substantial cash outlay. Yet farmers do not have collateral to secure 
adequate loans either from the agricultural finance corporation (AFC) or from commercial banks.  
A host of donor-government collaborations have also seen the establishment of projects and 
programs geared towards building smallholder farmers’ capacity. In recent years, NGOs have 
provided small loans to groups whose collateral is peer pressure, but these do not have sufficient 
capital to expand and probably cannot administer such loans profitably on a commercial basis 
(ibid). Other donor and NGO related programs make use of group approaches to achieve 
economies of scale in extension services, input procurement and sale of farm produce. For 
instance the National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Program (NAPEL); Kenya 
Agricultural Productivity Program (KAPP) and National Acceleration Agricultural Input Access 
Programme (NAAIAP). The latter programme also seeks to address farmers’ capacity by 
facilitating access to farm inputs in order to engender productivity. Initiated in July 2007, the 
program targets an outreach of approximately 2.5 million smallholder farmers throughout the 
country. So far, it has granted 36,000 resource poor farmers with both planting and top dressing 
fertilisers and seeds adequate for one acre of maize per beneficiary 
Long-term processes of agricultural research and development revolve around linking farmers’ 
demands, extension provision and the direction of research. Hence, the process of rationalising 
the network of all agricultural research institutes by consolidating operations into the Kenya 
Agricultural Research Institute (KARI). Efforts are also underway to evolve a regulatory 
framework to guide the cultivation of biotech crops, following the signing into law of the 
Biosafety Bill in 2009. Increased acknowledgement and support is also sought to develop new 
options for greater private sector participation in biotechnology and extension services. 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of government policy interventions will depend on the balance of 
socio-political forces in the policy making process in Kenya.  
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Evolution of Agricultural Policy Making in Kenya 
The politics of agricultural policy and, indeed, most sectors of the Kenyan economy are 
characterised by the partisan exercise of presidential powers, linkage between ethnicity and 
agricultural production systems, the quest for rent extraction and patronage by favoured 
groups/individuals. This partially explains the recent trends towards the disregard of evidence-
based policy formulation, and the gleeful expectation of access to donor funding (Ng’ethe and 
Musambayi 2004). Such informal practices can be traced way back to the Kenyatta and Moi 
regimes and has assumed greater proportions in the present Kibaki regime, evidenced by mega 
corruption in the sugar industry and fertiliser trade (The Standard, 26 June 2003; The Standard, 
12 February 2007; East African Standard, Wed 28th October 2009; The Standard, 05/04/2009; 
East African Standard, Wed 19th May 2010; The Standard, 10/02/2010).  
However, some authors (Bates, 1989) question the tendency to view the political elite as 
homogenous. Understanding the complexity of policy making process in Kenya entails the 
disaggregation of the elite in order to expose the differential leverages brought to bear on the 
policy process by different factions (see Alila 2006). The nature of policy making in Kenya 
revolves around the influence of ethnic political constituencies inhabiting high to medium 
potential agro-ecological zones which have, since the colonial period, dominated the bulk of the 
cash crop economy in Kenya. Kikuyu peasant movements since the post-colonial period have 
been instrumental in shaping the content of agricultural policy making through their electoral 
support for nationalist parties and movements. Indeed, the agricultural smallholder sector formed 
the backbone of nationalist parties and accounted for the high economic growth rates during the 
1960s and 1970s.  
In the Kenyatta regime, the patron-client framework embraced the “commanding heights of the 
economy including parastatals, financial institutions, the provincial administration and 
governmental departments which were manned by members of the Kikuyu ethnic community” 
(Ng’ethe and Musambayi 2004). To consolidate post-independence land tenure reforms, the 
Kenyan government undertook policy interventions that encompassed land re-distribution and 
resettlement, the provision of agricultural extension services and the opening up of new land 
frontiers through irrigation, among others. Economic growth engendered by land tenure reforms 
was also maintained by high levels of political repression.  
16 
 
The Kenyatta regime’s development trajectory was guided by the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 
1965 which was geared toward the development of smallholder farming, especially cash crops 
through the purchase of land, provision of support services like research, extension, animal 
health and credit. This development strategy was embedded within a uni-modal approach to 
development, which centered on the assumption that smallholdings are comparatively more 
productive than large farms. In addition, a small %age increase in productivity from many 
millions of small farmers would significantly enhance food security more than large farms, 
which would require a larger increase in output to bridge the same gap. This model of 
development launched Kenya on a trajectory of average growth rate of 6% per annum in the 
1960s and 1970s, with agriculture alone growing at an average rate of 4.9% and 3.8% per annum 
in the 1960s and 1970s respectively.  
Following in the footsteps of the Kenyatta regime, the Moi regime sought to cultivate his own 
ethno-regional base of support, albeit among Kalenjin and an alliance with Asian capital, by 
literally “looting” from Kikuyu capital. To cement his political base, ethno-regional barons seen 
as enjoying the support of their ethnic constituencies were often welcomed into the clique around 
the presidency. And whenever they lost their ethnic support bases they were summarily pushed 
out into political oblivion. While Kenyatta ruled at a time of economic prosperity, Moi was 
elected within a context of deteriorating economic circumstances. Consequently, political 
repression, the pillar of order under Kenyatta deepened in many ways under the Moi regime. 
Agricultural policy formulation and implementation was characterised by the cartelised and/or 
populist determination of producer prices and outputs of mainly coffee, tea, horticulture, sugar, 
and pastoralism. Directives from ‘above’ often had to be fitted within thin budgetary allocations 
with negative consequences for projects for which the funds were earmarked. In any case, the 
policy of expending resources in high potential areas seems to have engendered ethnic 
inequalities, with respect to the development of the cash crop economy. This has resulted in wide 
regional differences in access to infrastructure and certain agricultural services (see SID 2004; 
Readings on Inequality in Kenya, 2007; UNDP 2002). Without any significant change in the 
structures of presidential authoritarianism, successive changes of political leadership have led to 
continuity rather than significant change in the agricultural policy. The net impact is that 
smallholder “voice” and pro-poor policies have been neglected.  
17 
 
This tradition of policy making has been reinforced under the Kibaki regime. Indeed, Kibaki’s 
tenure has been understood as the opportunity for the re-grouping of corruption networks. Hence 
the mega-scandals related to the sugar industry and fertiliser prices. It is notable that prior to his 
election in 2002 as Kenya’s third president, Mwai Kibaki had been associated with the ruling 
class in Kenya for over fifty years. Policy making in Kenya thus takes the form of selective 
granting of trade licenses, import/export restrictions undergirded by a heavy regulatory 
framework involving government in all areas of agricultural legislation. This framework has 
provided a ready source of rent for political patrons and clients alike.  
Western donors have played a significant role in the marginalisation of smallholder voices since 
the 1980s. The onset of the crisis of the African states in the late 1970s into the early 1980s 
characterised by declining agricultural production, forced a re-think of the early postcolonial 
growth model. While the latter was based on active state intervention in the economy, the 1980s 
witnessed state withdrawal from the economy through liberalisation, privatisation and 
deregulation policies that favoured the active involvement of the private sector. In Kenya, this 
meant the erosion of the material basis of the earlier smallholder sector. Hence the stagnation, 
increased indebtedness, poverty and inequality that characterise the smallholder in Kenya today.  
By the 1980s, internal (government) policy reviews, academic studies and external donor reports 
converged around the notion that the institutional edifice undergirding the uni-modal model had 
developed strong vested interests. Vested interests were cited as interfering with public policy 
formulation and implementation and consequently the inefficient utilisation of scarce resources 
through skewed allocations toward clientelist networks.7 Unequal inter-industry terms of trade 
manifested in lower urban food prices. Higher urban consumer good prices was actually 
siphoning surplus from the rural areas where the majority derived their livelihoods, resulting in 
the deepening of rural poverty. Prescriptions to this dilemma entailed market liberalisation and 
removal of price controls which were however short-term in orientation. One argument suggests 
that the lack of local stakeholder consultation during these processes created mistrust and 
                                                 
7 Note that this period (70s/80s) also saw considerable donor -driven interventions such as district focus for rural 
development program (DFRD), akin to the current devolved funds, established in 1983 was preceded by 
considerable donor investment in Integrated Rural Development programmes. Donors also invested substantially in 
rural infrastructure, like rural access roads, storage facilities, production and marketing facilities like sugar and 
coffee. 
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misunderstanding between the government and donors and represents the area where the gap 
between policy formulation and implementation was widest. This is largely because 
implementation of reforms in the agricultural sector was largely tied to the release of donor aid 
(O’Brien and Ryan (2001) cited in Alila 2009).  
In retrospect, in the context of a colonially-inherited ethnic social division of labour and ‘rigged’ 
agricultural development strategies, neo-liberalisation policies have deepened horizontal 
inequalities. Such inequalities are manifested in emerging land uses and economic activities in 
parts of Central and Rift Valley regions, through the accelerated uptake of high value 
horticultural farming. Yet, all-round positive effects on agricultural productivity results from 
credit provision, extension advice and public provision of social amenities to smallholders 
(Bigsten and Ndung’u 1992). Thus, despite improvements to agricultural pricing policy in Kenya 
during the 1970/80s period, there were still large administrative problems in the marketing of 
agricultural produce, supply of inputs, and provision of credit. Delays in payments to 
smallholders, with strong disincentive effects arising from uncertainty, are legend. Hence the 
cycle of gluts and deficits that characterises the agricultural sector.  
Policy reform in the 1990s was therefore re-focused on smallholder agricultural development to 
achieve poverty reduction targets and boost agricultural productivity. The new donor onslaught 
was marked by the abolition of price controls in 1994 and the promulgation of private sector-led 
Agriculture Sector Investment Programs (ASIPs), to improve the effectiveness of donor 
assistance by moving beyond project-based approaches to include broader forms of public 
expenditure support. Donor concerns about mismanagement of funds have, however, on occasion 
slowed down reform processes. Despite this, numerous attempts have been made to revive 
agricultural development through publication of various policy statements. An example is the 
Kenya Rural Development Strategy8 (KRDS) (Republic of Kenya, 2002a) developed by 
government in November 2002 and embedded within the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
                                                 
8 KRDS was intended to serve as a roadmap to assist government, private sector, religious groups, Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), local communities, Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), and the 
development partners in defining interventions to improve the well being of the rural people (Republic of Kenya, 
2002b). 
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(PRSP) (Republic of Kenya, 2001).9 In 2004, the Government also adopted the Strategy for 
Revitalising Agriculture (SRA) that constitutes the reference framework for the development of 
agricultural sector for the following ten years, 2004-2014. SRA was the response from 
agriculture-related ministries (Republic of Kenya, 2004a).10 The SRA is integrated in the 
national Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS) policy 
document, developed by the Kibaki regime in December 2002 (Republic of Kenya, 2003). 
However, the introduction of the CAADP/AU framework for rejuvenation of African agricultural 
development has continued to generate tensions with the Agriculture Ministry. First, it is seen as 
competing with the Donor-financed SRA which is managed by the Ministry. Secondly, adequate 
budgetary allocations in the ministry do not reflect commitment to CAADP. Agriculture ministry 
bureaucrats argue that SRA has already captured most of the issues addressed in the CAADP 
priority pillars for investment. Moreover, neither the director of policy at the Agriculture 
ministry nor the secretariat personnel seem to be motivated since their new responsibilities in the 
process are not adequately remunerated. 
Modest achievements of the CAADP process include increased resource allocation to the 
agricultural sector from a low of 4% in year 2001/02 to 6.8% in 2007/08. Though it is difficult to 
ascertain increased budgetary allocations to CAADP awareness, the increased awareness and 
discussion about increased funding for the sector have had a role in this. Yet, it is also worth 
noting that allocation to agriculture in the 2009/2010 financial year dropped to less than 4% 
again. The process has also partially increased the need for evidence-based policy making 
advocacy. The stocktaking report undertaken for CAADP shows the policy, programmatic and 
                                                 
9 With the experience from the reforms period, the government saw the need to emphasise the use of participatory 
methodologies in policy making and implementation. The PRSP was prepared through a consultative process 
involving public and private sectors and civil society as was required by the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs). The PRSP process was another form of external influence on the local policies. The government committed 
itself to priority actions in two broad areas – creating opportunities for rural communities and the private sector to 
effectively carry out their activities in an increasingly competitive global environment, and accelerating policy and 
institutional reforms, particularly the large backlog of legislative and regulatory reforms. 
10 Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development (MOLFD) and Ministry of 
Cooperatives Development and Marketing (MOCDM). 
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institutional interventions that will need to be implemented in order to achieve CAADP and 
MDG1 targets.  
By and large, the budgetary process offers the only guarantee that the government will 
implement programs and projects proposed by various ministries. For the agricultural and related 
ministries, this entails presenting priority areas for funding in order to meet the objectives of the 
sector. This is because the budget contains a priori determined resource allocations, according to 
the revenue proportions set aside for the development budget in general. However, in certain 
cases political considerations may derail ministerial development plans due to the re-
organisations of spending priorities done by the finance ministry without consulting the relevant 
technocrats at the agriculture ministry. In view of such problems, the government adopted the 
medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) which allocates resources according to a three-
year rolling budget so as to align program and projects to the allocated funds. 
State of Policy Advocacy 
This section examines the actors, strategies and outcomes of some farmer organisations engaged 
in agricultural policy advocacy in Kenya. Small-scale, resource-poor farmers in Kenya have 
attempted to engage in representational activities to influence agricultural policies under 
colonially-constructed export enclave policy conditions that are less than optimal for 
representational politics (Ngethe and Odero 1994). The changing policy context engendered by 
economic liberalisation has led to the redefinition of the roles of various actors and processes 
that have hitherto informed agricultural policy making in Kenya. 
The main actors in the current policy making process comprise government, parliamentary 
caucuses, farmer-dominated civil society organisations and donors. Understanding the state of 
policy advocacy in Kenya is illustrated by Alila and Atieno’s (2004) five categorisations of 
forms of policy making in Kenya. These are bureaucratic initiatives both requiring and not 
requiring cabinet approval, executive directives, budget policy decisions, other domestic policy 
initiatives, and external policy initiatives.  
Briefly, policy making immediately after independence until the late 1980s was dominated by 
the policy inputs of state bureaucrats, through a process in which technical program and project 
proposals were prepared and handed over for cabinet approval. Policy making therefore revolved 
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around the level of directorates and permanent secretaries and their technical personnel. Policy 
making during this time lacked broad-based consultations. Hence, there were high rates of failure 
whenever it came to implementation processes. Local communities simply saw government 
interventions as mere predations on their lifestyles. 
However, consistent with patrimonial authoritarianism, dominant bureaucratic involvement in 
policy making has been emasculated by the persistence of executive assertiveness in determining 
policy input-output balance. Furthermore, within the executive, policy making has increasingly 
been dominated by a small closely coordinated clique between the Ministry of Finance and the 
Central Bank of Kenya (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001.). There has also been an enhanced 
involvement of technical assistance experts. While the latter have been instrumental in training 
policy advisers, they often weaken local ownership of development processes due to the 
conflicting objectives of donor countries and organisations and the host government. 
In recent years, voices of new actors in the policy making process have been recognised. 
Comprised of parliamentary caucuses, civil society organisations and smallholders, their voices 
and tactics to pressurise their representatives have led to a more systematic and inclusive 
process. Indeed, the PRSP and the ERS-WEC were relatively consultative compared to previous 
policy documents. Central to the pluralisation of the policy making arena has been the 
reconstitution of parliamentary committees11 on the one hand and the formation of parliamentary 
caucuses12 on the other. These are supported by the existence, albeit at a low level of 
mobilisation, by farmer-dominated civil society organisations like SUCAM (Sugar Campaign for 
Change in Western Kenya), NGOMA (“Ng’ombenaMahindi” to cover maize and dairy farmers 
in the North Rift), SAWA (“SautiyaWafugaji” – North Eastern pastoralists) and MAMBO 
(“MatundanaMboga”) for horticulture in Eastern province. 
However, the structure of agricultural interest representation has witnessed change and 
continuity in the actors involved, the nature of their activities, modes of policy engagement and 
                                                 
11 For example the Agriculture, land and Natural Resources Committee tasked to process legislation from all six 
Agriculture related ministries. 
 
12 Since 1999 MPs representing constituencies that grow coffee, tea, sugarcane and keep livestock have increasingly 
sought to voice concerns raised by commodity associations, e.g., Sugar Parliamentary Group, Coffee and Tea 
Parliamentary Group. 
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success in influencing policy outcomes. These varied outcomes reflect variation in the 
institutional capacities of farmer organisations at various levels of representation. Unfortunately, 
intervening between farmer organisations and policy outcomes is a pervasive neo-patrimonial 
culture that continues to determine the direction and content of agricultural policy. The little 
political space for maneuver has been legally delineated through the Cooperative Societies Act 
(2004) which spells out strict criteria from the establishment of a farmer organisation at the 
lowest level (a primary cooperative society) to the apex organisation representing all the member 
cooperative societies ( a union). As a result, farmer organisations in Kenya are organised on a 
commodity basis at various levels of representation ranging from the national to the district 
levels. Indeed, due to the political basis of agricultural policies in Kenya13 (Bates, 1981), some 
farmer organisations have come to be more influential than others when it comes to the 
representation of farmer interests in public policy.  
In Kenya, the demand side of policy formulation has mainly been dominated by three key farmer 
organisations: Kenya National Federation of Cooperatives (KNFC), Kenyan Planters' Co-
operative Union (KPCU) and Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers (KENFAP). 
The Kenya National Federation of Cooperatives (KNFC) 
The umbrella KNFC was formed on 28th April, 1964 as the Apex co-operative organisation of 
the Kenya cooperative Movement.14 This umbrella body represents eight (8) institutions with 
specific functions.15 At the middle level are countrywide District co-operative unions categorised 
as secondary co-operative societies. The lowest level comprises over 12,000 registered primary 
co-operative societies. The mandate of the KNFC – the body representing small and large 
cooperative farmers nationally and internationally - is to advocate for favourable policy and legal 
reform for all cooperatives. The body is governed by a National Governing Council made up of 
seven regional/provincial representatives. 
                                                 
13 See Bates, Robert. 1981. Markets and states in tropical Africa: The political basis of agricultural policies. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
14 The structure of cooperative organisations in Kenya has four tiers. At the apex, is a Union that represents all 
cooperative societies formed along commodity lines at the district levels. These are known as secondary 
cooperatives. Then the divisional cooperatives and others, called primary cooperatives. 
15 Kenya Planters Co-operative Union Ltd (KPCU; the Co-operative Bank of Kenya; New Kenya Co-operative 
Creameries Ltd (New KCC); Kenya Rural SACCO Society Union Ltd (KERUSSU); National Housing Co-operative 
Union Ltd (NACHU);Co-operative Insurance Company of Kenya (CIC); Kenya Union of Savings and Credit Co-
operatives Ltd (KUSCCO);Co-operative College of Kenya. 
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Recent notable achievements include successfully lobbying the Government on the passage and 
signing into law of the SACCO Bill (November, 14, 2008). The Bill opposed the retrenchment of 
employees as that would have affected the membership of SACCOs which are considered a 
critical source of credit by smallholders. Three new projects valued at $83,668 were also 
inaugurated after successfully lobbying for the inclusion of Kenya’s cooperative movement in 
the 2008 ILO/COOP Africa Programme. Each project is implemented by the Kenya National 
Federation of Co-operatives, Co-operative Insurance Company of Kenya, and Urara Farmers Co-
operative Society.16  New income generating projects have been founded under the Japanese 
funded “One Village One Product” (OVOP) initiative that emphasises value addition to and 
market access for agricultural produce. The KNFC has also successfully lobbied for change in 
the co-operative leaders elections procedures to avert succession crises in its leadership. A major 
resource is its close collaboration with the Cooperative Ministry which has organised capacity 
building workshops for training, corporate governance and financial policies. 
However, an institutional culture of poor management, corruption, nepotism and conflicts of 
interest, in which its individual employees compete for consultancy services with the 
organisation, has over the years weakened the capacity of the organisation to effectively 
represent the cooperative movement in Kenya (Gamba at al.1999, p.4). For instance, it failed to 
renew its membership with ICA. It therefore lost opportunities for projecting an international 
voice for farmers. Indeed, the leadership vacuum has been contested by other national 
organisations and cooperative unions which have become vocal advocates for their members’ 
interests.17 
Attempts at KNFC’s revitalisation were preceded by nationwide provincial co-operative leaders 
meetings in which new ideas were sought from farmers to legitimise the emerging governance 
structure – through elections of new leaders - and new mandates. The organisation was then re-
launched on 30th November, 2007. The national co-operative leaders’ conference then resolved 
to evolve a new financing and governance structure. At the core of this process was the revision 
of its bylaws in consultation with the Ministry of Co-operative Development & Marketing and 
                                                 
16 Located in Southern parts of Nyanza province, this union was Registered in 2005 and initiated soybean production 
to counter the effects of malnutrition and HIV/AIDS caused by environmental and health effects of tobacco and 
sugarcane farming in the area. 
17An interesting development in this regard is the role KUSCCO has played in enhancing the demands of the 
SACCOs; NACHU has also become an active representative of housing cooperatives in the country.  
24 
 
other cooperative unions. Remaining challenges include: the lack of effective leadership, poor 
member contributions, and accumulated financial liabilities, low staff morale and staff salary 
arrears.  
The Kenya Planters Cooperative Union (KPCU) 
During the colonial period the KPCU18 served as the marketing vehicle for White coffee farmers. 
Its core mandate has since revolved around negotiating with the government for higher producer 
prices and improved services for coffee farmers. The Kenya Planters’ Cooperative Union 
(KPCU) was the largest national coffee farmers’ cooperative union representing both small 
farmers and large scale coffee growers. Indeed, at the peak of its performance in the 1960s and 
1970s, the KPCU enjoyed the patronage of political elites from the Central province, a major 
coffee growing region. However, by the time of its collapse it was owed a whopping Ksh.3.4 
billion by politically influential people. A pervasive neo-patrimonial institutional culture has 
weakened its organisational ability to represent farmers over time, although the union currently 
still represents over 700,000 farmers and boasts a large infrastructural network which covers a 
number of collection points in several key agricultural provincial towns including Nakuru, 
Bungoma, Nandi Hills and Kisii.  
Two typical incidents suggest a hard road ahead for the proper functioning of KPCU. First, the 
Cooperatives Minister, according to recent moves, seems to favour the new parallel marketing 
agency – Kenya Co-operative Coffee Exporters Ltd (KCCE) - and indeed was reported to be 
negotiating to take over the “Kahawa House” warehouses belonging to KPCU. The KCCE is an 
initiative by the smallholder coffee farmers. It was formed to maximise returns on coffee sales by 
engaging directly in coffee marketing rather than going through the auction system. Barely eight 
months since its inception, over 110 coffee societies have signed marketing agreements with the 
state-backed marketer to earn better prices for their produce. Second, the Agriculture Minister in 
Kibaki’s government, in violation of the Coffee Act, replaced the incumbent directors in the 
Coffee Board of Kenya with political appointees with no background in coffee marketing. The 
                                                 
18 At the time of this research study KPCU was in serious financial and political doldrums that obtaining information 
on its current activities was difficult. It had effectively collapsed. It has been included here to illustrate the politics of 
agricultural institutions in Kenya. Other large farmer unions that have collapsed under the weight of liberalisation 
and patronage politics include Kilifi Cashew nuts factory in the Coast Province. Proposal to revive it have however 
been forwarded to the Ministry of Cooperatives; Kenya Farmers Association; and Kenya Grain Growers 
Cooperative Union. 
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Act requires that members of the board must include representatives of coffee traders and 
exporters. Similar incidents have also emerged around the irregular seizure of milling licenses 
for local cooperatives and awarded to what are perceived to be “politically correct” coffee 
millers (Daily Nation, Tuesday, December 8, 2009; The standard, September 22, 2009). 
Leadership wrangles, corruption, court cases and mismanagement have adversely affected its 
financial and organisational stability. These issues have frequently caused major disagreements 
between the Board of Directors and the management staff. In 2005, the then minister for 
Cooperative Development and Marketing, Mr. NjeruNdwiga, in a statement to parliament, listed 
the debtors who had borrowed money from KPCU ranging from 30 – 600 million Kenya 
shillings. The list includes prominent personalities associated with past and present regimes (see-
www.http://investmentnewskenya.com/pages/stories/kenya-planters-cooperative-union.php). 
A dispute resulted in all members of the management team resigning in September 2008. Kenya 
has thus been unable to match the previous volumes of coffee exports to China in the last two 
years due to wrangles at the Union (The Standard, August 8, 2009). Prior to 2008 revenues from 
coffee exported to China averaged KSh1.4 billion. The same problems have seen KPCU fail to 
pay farmers promptly for their produce. Out of frustration, some farmers in the Rift Valley and 
Western provinces have uprooted their coffee trees and smuggled hundreds of thousands of 
tonnes of Kenyan coffee for sale in the Ugandan market, leading to a serious deficit in the local 
market. 
Delayed payments to farmers have forced cooperatives affiliated with the union to market their 
coffee through private agents, thereby adversely impacting on KPCU’s financial income base. 
Other coffee cooperatives are reacting to this situation by revitalising their secondary cooperative 
unions, so that the unions can provide the services that KPCU used to render. Indeed, an 
emerging trend is that the majority of the farmers from Central and Eastern provinces, key coffee 
growing areas, are defying their management committees and deciding on a miller and marketer 
of their produce, alleging corruption and years of intimidation. To illustrate; in Central province 
a Mugama Farmers Cooperative Union has already acquired a license to directly mill and market 
coffee to the international market without going through KPCU. The construction of its coffee 
milling plant at Maragua is almost complete. Meru Central Coffee Farmers Union has also leased 
KPCU facilities to enable it to mill its coffee. The two unions have acquired trading licenses to 
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enable them to market their coffee directly (The standard, January 10, 2010).Whether the 
lowering of charges for milling, handling and quality analysis will reignite confidence in the 
union and invite an increased inflow of coffee from farmers is not yet clear. 
The Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers 
The Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers was founded in 1946 as the Kenya 
National Farmers Union (KNFU) to serve the interests of the large-scale White settler farmers. 
After independence in 1963, it changed its constitution in 1973 to accommodate small farmers. 
Thus during the 1960s and into the 70s, the union was a vocal representative of small farmer 
interests, through the demands for price control and equitable distribution of land. While new 
policy issue areas have since emerged, it still remains one of the largest small farmers’ 
organisations to date. 
The liberalisation of the economy since the 1980s has dealt a heavy blow to its institutional 
capacity and smallholder base. Consistent with liberalisation pressures, the union allowed 
individual and corporate membership. Corporate membership saw the absorption of commodity 
associations, other cooperatives, and firms into the new Union.  Its membership thus currently 
comprises 42,000 individuals, 2500 groups with 30-50 members, 16 commodity associations, 
and corporates (SACCOs & cooperatives). 
In June 2006, KENFAP commissioned a study through the support of GTZ/PSDA.19 The 
recommendations of the report suggested the re-orientation of its traditional advocacy mandate to 
a more service-oriented organisation providing capacity building (e.g. training and facility 
provision, produce processing, consultancy) and lobbying for constituency development funds, 
inputs and better prices. Indeed, the need to rejuvenate its core activities since 2002 stemmed 
from the weak financial capacity of the organisation which required a business orientation 
entailing diversification into other income generating projects. Core to this process were 
                                                 
19 Promotion of Private Sector Development in Agriculture (PSDA) is a bilateral technical assistance programme 
jointly implemented by the German Agency for International Development (GIZ) and the Ministry of Agriculture on 
behalf of the Government of Kenya through collaboration with other agricultural sector Ministries, mainly with the 
Ministry of Livestock Development, Ministry of Fisheries Development and Ministry of Cooperative Development 
and Marketing. 
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grassroots recruitment drives and attempts by the leadership to network with both local and 
international partners. 
The federation’s new vision is to realise “empowered Kenyan farmers with a strong voice” 
through the effective representation, provision of professional consultancy services as an income 
generating activity of the organisation at subsidised/ concessionary rates for the members and at 
commercial rates for the non-members; conduct research and promote intra- and inter- sectoral 
co-operation. Key challenges that continue to hamper its activities are the lingering political 
associations with political elites, a thin resource base, lack of competent and motivated staff and 
credit facilities. 
One significant finding is that cooperative unions in the agricultural sector are not as active in the 
policy advocacy space as non-agricultural cooperative unions such as KUSCCO and NACHU. 
Furthermore, they do not have the same capacity to effectively voice the concerns of their core 
constituencies. The recurrent theme is that the advocacy capacity of the farmer organisation has 
been weakened considerably due to neo-patrimonial institutional culture, inadequate technical 
personnel, thin financial base and general mismanagement. Capacity building programmes are 
critical in this regard. Historically, farmer organisations served as incubators for politically 
ambitious union leaders and as patronage machines for politicians seeking to shore up their 
political support bases. Especially in Kenya, where ethnic mobilisation is a very significant 
feature of politics, state resources have most often been channelled to areas perceived to be 
friendly to the incumbent regimes. This is true of the harambee movement as well as farmer 
organisations. As Barkan and Holmquist (1997) argue,  
 
“members and would-be members of local district councils establish reputations 
for community service by raising funds for self-help projects in the private sector 
and by lobbying appropriate state agencies to assist projects located in their areas. 
Members of Parliament and aspiring members likewise seek to "deliver the 
goods" on self-help; by so doing, they draw local self-help organisations and 
grass-roots political leaders into their personal political machines, and, in turn, 
attach their machines to the countrywide clientelist structures that dominate 
Kenyan politics and control patronage at the center of the Kenyan system (p. 
360).”  
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While policy advocacy is dominated by cooperatives and farmer unions in Kenya, non-
governmental organisations have increasingly emerged as vocal actors in the policy arena. These 
CSOs largely represent small farmers and engage in cross-cutting issues ranging from land 
rights, water and sanitation, food security and the provision of agricultural inputs.20 However, 
due to variations in mobilisation capacity, some CSOs have assumed more visibility in the policy 
arena than others.  
The following sub- section l describes in more detail the work of CSOs engaged in policy 
advocacy work on behalf of smallholders by focusing on two organisations – the Kenya Land 
Alliance (KLA) and Resource Conflict Institute (RECONCILE).  
Kenya Land Alliance 
Kenya Land Alliance, a not-for-profit and non-partisan umbrella network of 95 civil society 
organisations and individuals, was founded in 1999 and registered as a Trust in 2001. Its core 
commitments revolve around policy advocacy for the reform of outmoded land policies and laws 
in Kenya. Its activities are national in scope and are largely funded from foreign donor sources.21 
Key administrative functions are currently managed by a staff of eight people headed by the 
national coordinator. The main activities of the organisation are geared toward representing the 
marginalised rural and urban poor by advocating for and supporting pro-poor land policies that 
further social justice and enhance the security of tenure. 
The organisation was formed from the realisation that the postcolonial government land policy, 
legal and institutional framework created in the colonial period (beginning 1950s) was meant to 
meet the imperatives of political order and; enforced development of African areas. This 
framework had become out-dated and was no longer serving the needs for postcolonial social 
transformation. Long-term internal and external political, economic and socio-cultural changes in 
Kenya have necessitated the overhaul of these land policies. Increased demographic and 
environmental pressures have led to intense resource competition, especially over land, which 
continues to evolve into widespread violence. One recent notable outcome of the KLA’s 
advocacy in the context of land reforms is the adoption and publication of the findings of a new 
                                                 
20 Some NGOS in the food security, inputs provision and water and sanitation programmes are included in the 
database for this study.  
21 The donors include Actionaid, Dfid, Development Corporation of Ireland, Ford Foundation, Heinrich Boll 
Foundation, Freidrich Ebert Foundation, Ms-Kenya and Oxfam-GB. 
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National Land Policy. This has recently been published and critical sections dealing with the 
shift of radical title from the state to a proposed National Land Commission have been 
incorporated in the proposed new Constitution. Land is now a constitutional category in the 
proposed new Constitution. To be sure, a basis for these reforms had been set with the findings 
of a Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law System of Kenya (the Njonjo 
Commission, 1999) and the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (also known as the Ghai 
Commission22). The creative co-ordination of information gathering, sharing and networking 
among KLA’s member organisations has made the organisation a major focal point for land 
reform advocacy. 
Efforts to pressure government to modernise its land administration and management system saw 
the appointment of its national coordinator as one of the commissioners in the Presidential 
Commission on Public Inquiry into Illegal land Irregular allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u 
Commission).23 However, implementation of its findings has been a bone of contention, given 
the fact that beneficiaries of illegal allocations are powerful people in senior government 
positions. Recently, there have been moves by the Lands Ministry to revoke irregularly acquired 
title deeds, although this has mainly focused on land within the urban centers (The Standard, 27 
May 2010). Similar outcomes by the KLA also include documenting cases of environmental 
degradation. Notable in this regard are the encroachments on the Mau Forest water towers where 
President Moi and his cronies acquired large tracts of land. As a consequence, illegal occupants 
foisted their land on unsuspecting peasants to gain political support. In the latest attempts by the 
government to evict peasants from the forest, debates have emerged over whether these people 
should be compensated or not. In the course of these debates, reports emerged of government 
intentions to compensate even those who illegally obtained land in the forest (The Standard, 
06/05/2010; The Standard, 26/04/2010; The Standard, 07/05/2010; The Standard, 28/07/2009). 
                                                 
22 The Constitution of Kenya Review Commission popularly known as the Ghai Commission was chaired by 
constitutional law scholar Prof. Yash Pal Gahi and was chaged with writing a modern constitution for Kenya from 
2000 to 2004. 
 
23 This particular commission documented for the first time the extent to which the grabbing of public land had been 
perpetuated by politically connected people in the previous and current regimes. Some of these people are still hold 
powerful positions within the Kibaki regime.  
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These findings by the KLA have served as a point for mobilising pressure on the government to 
reform the land administration system.24 The organisation’s advocacy objectives have been 
realised from a knowledgeable perspective which incorporates the use of publications such as the 
Land Updates, Policy papers, posters and the print and electronic media. Through networking 
with similar orientated CSOs such as Action Aid, RECONCILE, Catholic Justice and Peace 
Commission, Kituo cha Sheria, Shelter Forum, Kenya Human Rights Commission, Hakijamii 
Trust and Forest Action Network, the Alliance has also increased awareness of Land policy 
issues among affected communities. Through capacity building programmes, the organisation 
has appreciated the importance of linking community struggles with national reforms. This 
originates from the realisation that top-down approaches characteristic of traditional CSO 
practices tend to be ineffective in dealing with land and natural resource issues among the poor 
and marginalised. The KLA activities are therefore strongly motivated by the plight of the fisher 
folk, women, marginalised ethnic minorities and small farmers. 
However, the activities of KLA are hampered by uneasy relations with fractions of the political 
elite and their sympathisers in “civil society.”25 Uneasy state-CSO relations have the potential of 
creating incentives for the government to block the organisation’s involvement in seeking 
information and participating in reform processes. The likelihood of the state relapsing into the 
traditional methods of either intimidation, threats or outright bans could hamper future advocacy 
programmes. The organisation also faces logistical, information acquisition and dissemination 
problems due to insufficient institutional capacity. 
The Resource Conflict Institute (RECONCILE) 
RECONCILE26 is an East African regional policy research and advocacy NGO registered in 
Kenya. The Institute conducts policy and legal research and education on environmental and 
natural resources. It also advocates for policies, laws and practices that empower resource 
                                                 
24 While the cabinet adopted the document what has emerged are only pronouncements of the intent to implement 
the findings. 
 
25 A notable voice against the proposed National Land Policy is the Kenya Landowners Association, an organisation 
representing local and foreign large land owners. 
26 RECONCILE hosted the Secretariat of KLA for in 1999 until 2000 and helped set up its institutional framework. 
It is also a founding member of LandNet East Africa, a Kampala-based regional network of land policy stakeholders 
from government, research institutions, and civil society organisations in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda. 
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dependent communities to influence policy processes and institutions that impact their access to 
natural resources and management of natural resource conflicts. On completion of training, such 
communities are expected to resolve environmental and resource conflicts; to effectively 
participate in policy, legislative and institutional processes for sustainable management of the 
environment and natural resources; and, to peacefully resolve other associated conflicts. Indeed, 
advocacy for pastoral land rights constitutes a significant focus for the organisation’s activities.  
The public has also been sensitised on critical resource issues through the stimulation of public 
debates through organised public fora. For instance, from 2003 to 2006, RECONCILE 
collaborated with the Dry lands Programme of the International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED),27 on a programme focused on capacity development for pastoral groups in 
East Africa advocating for policy frameworks that are supportive of pastoralism as a livelihood 
and land use system. Networking with other organisations like the KLA saw both of them 
pushing for a review of the provisions of the Draft National Land Policy on customary land 
tenure and common property resources.   
The organisation is also involved in capacity building of community based organisations to 
engage effectively in sustained land rights advocacy by providing technical assistance in research 
and information acquisition. This is necessary for informed policy advocacy, thus linking local 
advocacy work to the wider policy environment and to organisations that have expertise and 
competence in relevant policy areas. Another instance is the collaborative advocacy work 
between RECONCILE and Waso Trust Land Project and OSILIGI – two pastoralist 
organisations in Isiolo and Lakipia in northern Kenya. The urgency of pastoralist rights issues 
should be understood in the context of recent announcements of the possibility of discovering 
commercial oil and gas deposits by several foreign companies28 in northern Kenya, home to the 
largest populations of pastoralists. RECONCILE and other human rights groups have embarked 
on advocacy work that seeks to raise awareness on the possibilities of doom or economic boom 
vi-a-vis pastoralist land rights and livelihoods. 
                                                 
27 An independent, non-profit organisation promoting sustainable patterns of world development through 
collaborative research, policy studies, networking and advocacy. 
28 China National Offshore Oil Corporation, Africa Oil, Lion Energy, China Petroleum Corporation 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
Independent Kenya inherited a dual agrarian structure created during the colonial period to 
benefit white settlers. It was characterised by large land holdings enjoying disproportionate 
supplies of highly fertile land, better infrastructure, extension services and credit outlays while 
smallholder agricultural systems practiced largely by indigenous ethnic communities were 
plagued by land shortages, limited access to credit and infrastructure. The brief post-
independence interlude (1963 – ca.1970) witnessed timid state-driven land tenure reforms which 
undergirded high economic growth rates. By the 1970s, the practical limits on the private 
property frontiers revealed the limits of this mode of agricultural development. Indeed, its effects 
are still present. They include high land pressure, pervasive land sub-divisions, extensive 
landlessness and poor water utilisation practices. Others include low agricultural productivity, 
malnutrition, expansive urban and rural slums, and high under- and un-employment rates.  
The attempts of cooperative societies and farmer unions to amplify the concerns of both large 
and small farmers have received differential treatment. While large farmers extracted 
disproportionate benefits through the control of the state bureaucracy, self-help and smallholder 
organisations were co-opted and re-oriented to the service of politically ambitious leaders and 
politicians. This is still the case to date. Farmer organisations are characterised by 
mismanagement and institutional weaknesses which hinder effective representation of farmers. 
Due to the challenges brought on by liberalisation of the sector, the current policy advocacy 
arena is less vibrant relative to the immediate post-independence period when farmer 
organisations were influential in the public policy process. There is, however, a recent 
resurgence of CSOs which have begun to actively articulate the concerns of smallholder famers. 
In this regard, several key policy recommendations are proffered: 
 The initiation of comprehensive land and land tenure reform by supporting the newly 
adopted National Land Policy. This should be geared toward establishing small family 
farms due to their relative efficiency as compared to large farms; 
 Investment and repair of rural infrastructure to enable ease of transportation and storage 
and also to improve irrigation systems within smallholder areas; 
 Development of policies and regulations that encourage local irrigation equipment 
manufacture and/or joint agricultural engineering arrangements; 
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 Government facilitation for the access to cheap credit by small farmers;  
 Provision and strengthening of extension services and other technical support services, 
like training in soil and water conservation and animal husbandry;  
 Increased financial allocations to research and innovation grants to universities and 
agricultural research institutes should stimulate interest in improved production and 
distribution technologies;  
 The government should embark on the modernisation and/or establishment of agricultural 
technology demonstration centers to facilitate the dissemination and adoption of new 
appropriate technologies; 
 The government should facilitate the access to market information through farmer 
networks within farmer organisations by encouraging investment in ICTs and other 
media. 
. 
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